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This paper examines how differences in the bargaining power of 
husband and wife affect the distribution of expenditures in rural 
Bangladeshi households. It contributes to the literature testing various 
household models by using measures of bargaining power that have 
been informed by ethnographic evidence and qualitative methods. 
 
Background 
We tested two measures of assets as measures of individual bargaining 
power: current assets and the value of assets brought to marriage. We 
constructed these measures from a module on family background, 
marriage, and inheritance that we designed based on a qualitative 
study conducted in parallel with the main household survey. We 
examined the extent to which characteristics of husbands and wives, 
as well as their families of origin, affected the assets brought to 
marriage, and also investigated whether current assets were 
determined by assets brought to marriage and individual, household, 
and extended family characteristics. We then used the information on 
family background of both spouses as instruments for the asset 
measures and investigated the robustness of these coefficients to 
various specifications of assets. 
 
Sample and Data Collection Methods 
We used data from a new household 
survey in three sites in Bangladesh that 
were chosen as part of an impact 
evaluation of programs disseminating new 
agricultural technologies. For each 
household, a four-round survey collected 
detailed information on individuals= income 
earning activities, expenditures on various 
categories, food and nutrient intakes, time 
allocation patterns, and health and 
nutritional status. 
Between the second and third survey 
rounds, a parallel study using qualitative 
methods was conducted in a pair of 
villages in each site to elicit group 
members' views on the effects of NGO 
programs and the new technologies on 
incomes, education and health of children, 
women's status and empowerment, etc. From the results of this study 
and from other models, we formulated questionnaire modules on 
premarital assets, transfers at marriage, inheritance, and indicators of 
women's mobility and empowerment, which we reviewed and 
pretested prior to fielding the last round of the survey. 
 
Assets of Husbands and Wives 
Husbands consistently owned more assets than wives, both at present 
and at the time of marriage. Apart from household durables, the most 
frequently owned assets were jewelry, agricultural equipment, large 
trees, and vehicles. Seventy percent of wives owned jewelry and 15 
percent owned household durables. Irrigation and agricultural 
equipment were most often considered joint assets. 
In the fourth survey round, respondents were asked to recall the 
assets they owned before marriage. Both male and female 
respondents also provided information about their premarital 
occupation and experience in farming, day-labor, or other business 
activities. 
Cattle accounted for the bulk of male premarital assets. Land was 
seldom owned before marriage, reflecting the fact that most sons live 
on their parents' farm when they get married and that most land 
inheritance occurs upon the death of a parent. Female premarital 
assets were much less valuable, most often consisting of food. 
A specific module about transfers at marriage was admin-istered 
to the female respondents. Asset categories for these modules were 
complemented by specific questions about jewelry and cash 
exchanges at the moment of the 
wedding. The transfers to the bride 
and groom were computed by 
summing up all transfers to each 
individual and assigning to each 
individual half of the transfers 
reported "to the couple." 
 
Results 
Determinants of assets at mar-
riage. Husbands with more than 
primary schooling owned more 
valuable assets, but wives with more 
than primary schooling owned a less 
valuable stock of assets at marriage. 
While the husband=s characteristics 
significantly affected his assets at 
marriage, so did his parents= 
landholdings. The wife=s parents= landholdings did not affect husband=s 
assets at marriage. 
For wives, parental landholdings positively and significantly 
  affected the value of their assets at marriage. The total value of a 
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Women's assets have a positive and 
significant effect on expenditures for 
children's clothing and education. 
Given that Bangladeshi women are 
disadvantaged with respect to both 
asset ownership and education, the 
greatest effect of interventions to 
increase resources under their control 
may be felt by the next generation.  
wife=s assets was also higher when her father had some secondary 
education. Wives whose husbands= parents had larger landholdings or 
whose husbands had university educations brought more valuable 
assets to marriage. The asymmetric effect of in-laws= landholdings 
(husbands= parents= landholdings affected wife=s assets at marriage, but 
not vice versa) confirms that there is selection and bargaining in the 
marriage market, and that characteristics of the parents matter as 
much as those of the prospective spouses. 
 
Determinants of current assets. We included the value of assets at 
marriage among the determinants of current assets to see whether 
spouses with a larger stock of assets at marriage gained a Ahead start.@ 
Analysis indicates that husbands= assets at marriage are not a 
significant determinant of current assets but parental landholdings 
continue to be positive and significant. 
Assets at marriage do not appear to affect wives= current assets. 
Her parent=s land and the number of living brothers are positively 
related to her asset position, suggesting that throughout her lifetime, 
her extended familyCespecially her brothersC remains a source of 
support. Marrying a better-educated man does have some advantages: 
women whose husbands have some secondary or some university 
education own more current assets. 
 
Determinants of expenditure patterns. Our results indicate that the 
unitary model of the householdCa model in which individuals within 
the same household share the same preferences, or a single 
decisionmaker decides for allCdoes not operate in rural Bangladesh. 
Even in a patriarchal society where husbands control most of the 
household=s resources, when household expenditure is controlled for, 
coefficients on husband=s and wife=s assets in the majority of the 
expenditure shares regressions were significantly different from zero. 
A greater number of coefficients on men's and women's assets were 
significant in the specification with current assets. The most consistent 
result is that women=s assets at marriage and current assets had a 




Finally, we compared alternative estimates of the effects of men=s 
and women=s assets. Since both assets at marriage and current assets 
are endogenous, ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates provide 
biased estimates of the effect of men=s and women=s assets. In the 
case of expenditures on education, the magnitude of the coefficient of 
women=s assets at marriage in the education equation increases from 
0.17 in the OLS estimate to 0.34 for the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimates, and from 0.17 to 0.83 for current assets. This 
suggests that neglecting the endogeneity of asset measures may lead to 
biases in the measurement of the effect of men=s and women=s assets 
on their bargaining power. 
 
Discussion 
This paper tested the unitary model of the household against an 
alternative that postulates that individuals have different preferences 
and do not pool their resources. Our results suggest that, even in the 
patriarchal society of rural Bangladesh, a collective model better 
describes household decisionmaking. 
Our results also suggest that conventional bargaining models need 
to be modified. Even if the endogeneity of current assets is controlled 
for by using assets brought to marriage, these are determined in the 
context of marriage markets. In extended family settings found in 
many parts of the developing world, taking into account the bargaining 
power of other members of the extended family may be key to 
explaining intrahousehold allo-cation outcomes in societies with 
complex household structures. 
Finally, our work adds to the evidence that increased resources 
controlled by women are often allocated toward children. Given that 
women in Bangladesh are disadvantaged with respect to both asset 
ownership and education, the greatest effect of interventions to 
increase resources under their control may be felt by the next 
generation. placed in villages where there is no other school within a 
one-hour=s walk. The cost-effective-ness analysis confirms that the 
well-targeted construction of new schools is likely to be the least 
costly method of improving schooling outcomes at this time. 
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